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EXPLOITATION OF ITEMS RECOVERED DURING DEMINING OPERATIONS: 2012/13 
 
This report and the associated exploitation work was funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Background 
 
1. Exploitation1 work was carried out on SB-33, SB-81 and P4B mines during Phase 1 of clearance 
operations; findings from this work are detailed in the 2010 Falkland Islands Demining Programme 
Exploitation Report. 
 
2. Exploitation work was conducted on the following items: 
 
a. C3B anti-tank mines  (Figure 1) recovered from SA064; 
b. An SB-33 anti-personnel mine (Figure 2) discovered outside the mine rows of SA064; 
c. Components of booby traps recovered from SA064. 
 
3. Work was carried out by Colin King, technical director of Fenix Insight Ltd, from 19 – 22 March 2013.   
 
4. The findings from this work were intended to assess the conditon of the ordnance in order to: 
 
a. Establish the general condition of the mines; 
b. Indicate their ability to function, either as designed, or by other mechanisms; 
c. Highlight significant changes in their characteristics that might effect detectability or sensitivity. 
 
 
Figure 1  
The Spanish C3B anti-tank mine 
 
Figure 2  
The Italian SB-33 anti-personnel mine 
 
Aim 
 
5. The aim of this report is to outline the findings from exploitation work provided within the Falkland 
Islands demining programme during the third phase of clearance. 
 
Mine exploitation 
 
C3B 
                                                          
1
  The process of disassembling explosive ordnance in order to accurately characterise the munition. 
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6. Cracks were observed in the plastic casing of C3B mines recovered shortly after the 1982 conflict; it 
was therefore expected that mines remaining more than 30 years later would show substantial 
deterioration.    
 
7. The deterioration of the plastic casing could be significant for the following reasons: 
 
a. Cracks might allow water into the fuze housing, causing: 
 
i. Rusting of the striker spring (with consequent reduction in detectability); 
 
ii. Degradation of the ignition composition, with consequent inability to function. 
 
b. The integrity of the fuze housing could be compromised, leading to a significant drop in 
operating pressure.  This means that an affected mine might function under a load similar to 
that of an anti-personnel mine. 
 
c. The break-up of the mine body might allow the main charge to disintegrate, eventually 
rendering the mine ineffective. 
 
8. Findings from the exploitation of the C3B mines are at Annex A. 
 
SB-33 
9. A solitary SB-33 anti-personnel mine was discovered in SA064, but located approximately 70 m from 
the nearest mine row.   
 
10. The mine had sustained external damage to the casing and the detonator plug, but it’s internal 
condition was unknown. 
 
11. The mine was set aside in the hope that exploitation might offer some explanation for its location 
and condition.  
 
12. Findings from the exploitation of the SB-33 mine are at Annex B. 
 
Booby trap 
13. Remnants of a booby trap were discovered towards the southern end of SA064.  The components 
included the wooden stake, main charge, safety fuse and detonator.  The firing device normally associated 
with such booby traps had not yet been located. 
 
14. Detailed exploitation of the booby trap remnants was not deemed to be worthwhile, but comments 
are at Annex C. 
 
Creation of training aids 
15. The 14 C3B mines recovered for exploitation were rendered inert, with all explosive components 
being sent for demolition.   The bases of the inert mine casings were then marked with blue paint (the 
NATO colour code for inert munitions).  The inert mines are shown in Figure 3. 
 
 Falkland Islands Demining Programme - Exploitation 
3 
 
 
Figure 3 
Inert mines 
for use as 
training aids 
and detection 
samples 
 
16. Most of the inert mines contain the original metal content and can therefore be used for detection 
trials.  The two mines with metal content removed were clearly marked and were retained for display 
purposes only. 
 
17. One of the mines was sectioned to provide a training aid (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 
One of the 
C3B mines 
was sectioned 
to produce 
this training 
aid  
 
Conclusions 
18. The exploitation process was conducted successfully and without incident. 
 
19. In particular, the work offered a detailed insight into the condition of the C3B mines and confirmed 
the most likely explanation for the location and position of the isolated SB-33.  It also provided inert 
samples of C3B mines for use as detection samples and training aids. 
 
20. Detailed conclusions relating to the items examined are included in the relevant annexes.  
 
Recommendations 
21. The provision of technical support services, including the exploitation of target mine types and the 
creation of inert samples, is recommended as a component of all future clearance contracts.   
 
22. Exploitation activity may offer important information for future programmes on issues such as the 
overall condition, viability and detectability of target mines.  This type of technical intelligence should be 
taken into account during the planning phases in order to allocate appropriate resources over a suitable 
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period; it is therefore recommended that exploitation work is considered prior to the detailed planning of 
clearance operations. 
 
23. It is further recommended that there is a provision for additional technical support during a 
programme, if necessary.  The isolated SB-33 mine illustrated one scenario where this was worthwhile; 
other scenarios might include detection anomalies, munitions in a particularly dangerous condition and 
technical aspects of accident investigation. 
 
 
Colin King 
Technical Director 
Fenix Insight Ltd 
 
April 2013 
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ANNEX A 
EXPLOITATION OF THE C3B ANTI-TANK MINE 
Background 
1. The C3B (shown in Figure A1) is a large and powerful anti-tank mine with the following specifcations 
quoted by the Spanish manufacturer, Explosivos Alavese (EXPAL) SA: 
 
Weight 5.7 kg Diameter 290 mm 
Explosive weight 5 kg Height 60 mm 
Explosive type TNT/RDX/Al (50/30/20) Operating pressure 275 kg 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 
The Spanish C3B anti-tank mine, 
shown here armed, with fuze fitted 
and safety cap to the left 
 
2. The C3B uses a fuzing mechanism very similar to that of the P4B anti-personnel mine, protected by 
an additional plastic assembly to bring the operating pressure up to an acceptable level.  Most of the 
components of the C3B are based on polystyrene plastic and are solvent-bonded together; this makes 
disassembly difficult and potentially dangerous.  Components of the C3B are shown in Figure A2. 
 
3. Other than the aluminised explosive, the sole metallic content of the C3B is a steel spring weighing 
approximately 0.15 g.  During Phase 1, it proved difficult to locate this spring reliably using any 
commercially-available detector.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 
Components of 
the C3B 
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Methodology 
 
4. Each of the 32 C3B mines located in SA064 was photographed in position and allocated a unique 
serial number.  The mines were extracted from the ground and defuzed in the minefield.  A sample of 14 
mines were then selected and disassembled for examination.   
 
5. All of the mines had been buried beneath peaty soil and vegetation, with depths typically around 100 
mm.  Mines from a variety of conditions were represented within the 14 chosen; some were extracted from 
firm ground while others were partially or completely submerged (see Figures A3 and A4).   
 
Figure A3 
C3B in firm ground 
Figure A4 
Some mines were submerged 
 
6. The mine bodies were opened and the main charge removed; the inside of the casing was then 
cleaned and examined for cracks.   
 
7. The external and internal condition and constituency of the main charge was assessed before being 
set aside for demolition. 
 
8. The webbing carrying handle (which is cast into the explosive) was cleaned and fastened back into 
position in the casing using adhesive.  Previous examples had been re-assembled using metal rivets, which 
substantially increased the metallic signature of the mines; this means that they cannot be used as 
detection targets. 
 
9. The solvent bond around the detonator was removed mechanically, the bond broken from around 
the thread of the detonator and the detonator unscrewed from the base of the fuze.    
 
10. The bond around the shoulder of the external fuze housing was then broken, allowing the removal of 
the pressure plate and access to the fuze mechanism and striker spring.  Some of the internal fuze housings 
could be opened by breaking the plastic bonds while others had to be cut.  
 
11. All components were examined and photos were taken at every stage of disassembly.   
 
12. A sample of five live fuzes, which had not been disassembled, were placed on a sandbag and 
subjected to pressure (well in excess of that normally required for initiation) using the bucket of an 
armoured excavator in order to assess the condition of the detonator. 
 
13. The main observations from exploitation are illustrated and described below. 
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Exterior characteristics 
 
Figure A5 
The top surface (left) and underside (right) of the mine body with fuze removed. All of the mines recovered 
appeared to be in good condition superficially; however, every mine had cracks in the casing 
 
Figure A6 
Fine cracks in the casing allow the ingress of water; freezing then gradually extends the breaks 
 
 
 
Figure A7 
The top surface (left) 
and underside (right) 
of the fuze assembly. 
Most of the fuze 
bodies appeared to 
be undamaged and 
well sealed, yet 
almost all were wet 
inside 
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Fuze mechanism 
 
Figure A8 
Components of the C3B fuze 
mechanism.  Pressure 
applied to the top of the fuze 
forces the striker through a 
flexible ‘forcing collar’, which 
accelerates the striker into 
the detonator.  The spring 
makes relatively little 
contribution to this effect 
 
 
Figure A9 
The sealed fuze assembly is very similar to that used in the P4B anti-
personnel mine.  Water was found inside almost all of these units 
Figure A10 
Due to corrosion, this striker 
Spring weighed only 0.09 g 
 
Explosive components 
 
Figure A11 
Upper section of the casing removed to reveal the 
main charge; most were in good condition with little 
or no cracking or deterioration evident in the 
explosive.  Although the inside of the plastic casing 
was wet, the cast filling contains very few voids  
Figure A12 
Booster pellets are composed of a pressed 
TNT/RDX (60/40) mixture and virtually all were in 
good condition.  Despite the neoprene seal 
between the base of the fuze and the booster, 
all of the booster pockets contained water 
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Figure A13 
 The composition of the main charge is quoted as 
being TNT/RDX/aluminium (50/30/20) but, as 
shown here,  the mixture is rarely homogenous.  
The aluminium content does not affect the 
detectability of the mine 
Figure A14 
The proportions of the constituents in the high 
explosive varied significantly; this sample contained 
no aluminium whatsoever.  This is evidence that 
different material characteristics and specifications 
may be found within the same lot number 
 
 
Figure A15 
 All of the C3B detonator assemblies examined 
were wet.  The protective layer of clear plastic 
film over the stab receptor (right) did not 
provide an effective water-tight seal 
Figure A16 
Subjecting live fuzes to an operating load (>300 kg) 
using an excavator bucket did not produce any 
detonations.  The most likely explanation is that the 
stab-receptive composition is no longer functional 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
14. All of the C3B mines recovered from SA064 appeared to be in good condition superficially, but all of 
the casings were cracked.  The ingress and subsequent freezing of water is gradually causing the 
deterioration of the casings, but the effect is slow due to the small volumes of water and the flexibility of 
the plastic.  The process is likely to accelerate as existing cracks enlarge and the plastic becomes more 
brittle. 
 
15. The rate of deterioration has been slowed substantially by burial.  Polystyrene is vulnerable to UV 
light and (according to observations made in the late 1980s) the casings of mines exposed to the sun had 
cracked badly within a year or two of exposure.  Burial is also likely to reduce temperature gradients within 
the mines, minimising the expansion of explosive during hot weather and of water during freezing 
conditions. 
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16. There is little evidence of deterioration to the plastic of the fuze housing; it is therefore reasonable to 
expect that the operating pressure of most buried mines will still exceed 200 kg.  However, mines that have 
been exposed to sunlight may be capable of functioning under far lower loads. 
 
17. All fuze mechanisms appeared to be operational, despite the corrosion of some striker springs.  Fuzes 
are likely to remain functional despite the deterioration of the striker spring. 
 
18. The striker spring is the only metal component within the mine.  The spring weighs less than 0.15 g 
when new and is positioned around 20 mm below the surface of the pressure plate; this makes its 
detectability marginal at best.  If the striker spring is corroded, the metal content of the mine may be 
reduced or eliminated altogether, making it impossible to locate with a metal detector.  
 
19. The explosive constituents of the main charge may vary, but this has little significance to the 
functionality of the mine.  The booster and main charge remain intact while enclosed by the mine casing 
and solubility in ground water is low; the charges are therefore likely to remain viable for many years in 
buried mines.   
 
20. Where C3B mines have been exposed to sunlight or have sustained mechanical damage to the 
casing, it is likely that the main charge and booster will gradually begin to crack and will eventually 
disintegrate. 
 
21. Findings from the Ageing Study suggest that the primary explosive in the detonator is likely to remain 
viable for many years, being well protected by its plastic casing.  However, the stab-receptive composition 
used to initiate the primary explosive is vulnerable to water and prolonged immersion appears to have 
rendered many of the detonator assemblies incapable of functioning as designed. 
 
22. The ingress of water into the detonator is dependent on a number of factors and it is entirely 
possible that some remain capable of operating as designed.  Those that cannot, but which still contain 
viable primary explosive, may be detonated by other influences, such as fire or impact. 
 
 
 Falkland Islands Demining Programme - Exploitation 
B - 1 
 
ANNEX B 
EXPLOITATION OF THE ISOLATED SB-33 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE 
Background 
1. The SB-33 is a small anti-personnel mine with the following specifications (approximate): 
 
Weight 140 g Diameter 85 mm 
Explosive weight 35 g Height 30 mm 
Explosive type RDX/HMX (98/2) Operating pressure 8 kg 
 
2. The mine is extremely robust, with most of the components made from polycarbonate plastic; the 
fuzing mechanism is designed to be highly resistant to impact and shock.  Some of the SB-33 mines 
recovered from SA064 are shown in Figure B1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1  
SB-33 mines recovered from mine 
rows in SA064 
 
3. The isolated mine found in SA064 (Figure B2) showed obvious damage, particularly to the base 
(Figure B3) where the detonator plug was cracked and a section of the mine casing had been broken away.  
The broken section of the base was found close to the mine body. 
 
4. The primary purpose of exploitation was to gather evidence to support an explanation for this mine’s 
presence outside the minefield rows, in addition to making it safe for disposal.  
 
Figure B2 
 The SB-33 mine found in SA064  
Figure B3  
Base view of the casing 
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Findings  
Figure B4 
On initial inspection, the fuze and main charge 
appeared to be  relatively intact.  The ingress of 
water would not prevent the mine from functioning 
Figure B5 
Removal of the fuze plunger revealed that the 
several of the fuze components had been shattered 
and the striker displaced 
 
Figure B6 
Removal of the fuze components exposed the full 
extent of the damage 
Figure B7 
The detonator plug had also been shattered and 
could not be used to remove the detonator 
 
Figure B8 
The detonator was seized into place and surrounded 
by impacted explosive from the main charge  
Figure B9 
The main charge, normally a rigid horseshoe of 
pressed explosive, had been pulverised  
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Conclusions 
 
5. The isolated SB-33 mine discovered in SA064 had clearly been subjected to a substantial amount of 
shock.  This was evident in the shattering of fuze components made from polycarbonate (the plastic used in 
protective visors) and the pulverisation of the main charge. 
 
6. Although the exterior of the mine casing showed no evidence of scarring from fragmentation, the 
internal damage is entirely consistent with the effects of a nearby detonation. 
 
7. The damage to the mine, together with its displacement and the presence of a crater in the mine 
row, strongly suggest that this mine was thrown out by the detonation of an artillery shell during the 
conflict. 
 
8. The mine was incapable of functioning as designed; however, the condition of the detonator means 
that it might have been in an unstable state. 
 
9. The demining team and DPO were absolutely correct not to attempt to defuze or disassemble this 
mine. 
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ANNEX C 
COMMENTS ON BOOBY TRAP REMNANTS 
Background 
1. Several booby traps (BT) were discovered during Phase 3, all being typical of the type laid by 
Argentinian forces during the conflict.  Each consists of a simple firing device in which a spring-loaded 
striker is released by tension on a tripwire.  The firing device is designed to initiate a percussion cap, which 
ignites a length of pyrotechnic fuze running to a detonator placed within the main charge.  The main charge 
consists of TNT blocks. 
 
2. The following booby traps have been located: 
 
SA number Number of BT found 
Number of TNT blocks 
In each 
064 2 31 
095 2 6 
095A 2 5 
 
 
3. None of the firing devices associated with these booby traps have yet been located, but they are 
believed to be the type shown in Figure C1.  
 
4. Detailed exploitation of the booby trap remnants was not deemed to be worthwhile; however, some 
of the comments in the captions below are based on findings from the Landmine Ageing Study1. 
 
Figure C1 
The firing device typically used with Argentinian booby traps.  The 
tube contains a spring-loaded striker retained by both a pin and a 
shear wire; this allows for optional pull or pressure actuation.  The 
striker initiates a percussion cap, which ignites a safety fuse link to 
the detonator in the main charge.  The safety fuze is retained in the 
fuze holder by the screw on the side 
Figure C2 
The fuze holder with percussion cap 
removed.  The cap unit is a standard 
12 bore shotgun primer.  Although 
robust, these are unlikely to remain 
functional after 30 years exposure to 
wet conditions 
 
 
                                                          
1
  Three year Landmine Ageing Study conducted by C King Associates Ltd in association with James Madison University 
under funding from US State Department, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) 
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Findings 
 
Figure C3 
Components of the Argentinian firing device  
 
Figure C4  
TNT charges  from a booby trap in SA064.  These 
appear to have been 400 g blocks of pressed TNT, 
wrapped in waxed paper.  Pressed TNT is deemed 
‘cap sensitive’, meaning that it can be initiated 
directly by a No 8 strength detonator.  The edges of 
the blocks have been eroded but the bulk of the 
explosive remains intact.  Historical data on TNT 
suggests that it can remain capable of detonation 
for several decades 
Figure C5 
TNT blocks containing detonators and the remnants 
of safety fuzes.  It is clear that any pyrotechnic 
composition in the fuse or detonator will be non-
functional.  However, findings from the Ageing Study 
(involving explosives of a similar type and age) 
suggested that the primary explosive in the 
detonator may be viable; this means that the 
explosive could be initiated by either fire or 
substantial impact 
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Conclusions 
 
5. The booby traps found during Phase 3 were incapable of functioning as designed for the following 
reasons: 
 
a. Firing devices were absent; 
 
b. Even if firing devices had been present, data from the Ageing Study suggests that internal 
components (such as the steel striker spring) would be seized and incapable of functioning; 
 
c. The shotgun primer used as the percussion cap is unlikely to remain functional after 
prolonged exposure to wet conditions; 
 
d. The pyrotechnic compositions of the safety fuse and detonator flash receptor are 
vulnerable to water and were virtually unprotected for more than 30 years. 
 
6. The Ageing Study suggests that the primary explosive within the detonator may still be capable of 
detonation.  Initiation might arise from heat (such as a peat fire) or from shock (such as the impact from a 
flail hammer). 
 
7. If the detonator functions, it is quite likely that TNT in contact will be initiated; this may, in turn, 
detonate other adjacent TNT blocks. 
 
